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Abstract  
The revolution brought about with the transition from Industry 1.0 to 4.0 has expanded the cyber threats 
from Information Technology (IT) to Operational Technology (OT) systems. However, unlike IT 
systems, identifying the relevant threats in OT is more complex as penetration testing applications highly 
restrict OT availability. The complexity is enhanced by the significant amount of information available 
in online security catalogues, like Common Weakness Enumeration, Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures and Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification, and the incomplete 
organisation of their relationships. These issues hinder the identification of relevant threats during risk 
assessment of OT systems. In this thesis, a methodology is proposed to reduce the aforementioned 
complexities and improve relationships among online security catalogues to identify the cybersecurity 
risk of IT/OT systems. The weaknesses, vulnerabilities and attack patterns stored in the online 
catalogues are extracted and categorised by mapping their potential mitigations to their security 
requirements, which are introduced on security standards that the system should comply with, like the 
ISA/IEC 62443. The system's assets are connected to the potential threats through the security 
requirements, which, combined with the relationships established among the catalogues, offer the basis 
for graphical representation of the results by employing tree-shaped graphical models. The methodology 
is tested on the components of an Information and Communication Technology system, whose results 
verify the simplification of the threat identification process but highlight the need for an in-depth 
understanding of the system. Hence, the methodology offers a significant basis on which further work 
can be applied to standardise the risk assessment process of IT/OT systems.  
Keywords: cybersecurity, risk assessment, IT/OT, CWE, CVE, CAPEC, security principles, security 
patterns, attack-defense trees  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Problem statement  
The progress seen in Industry from 1.0, describing the mechanisation and steam power 
machinery, to 4.0, representing the implementation of cyber-physical systems (CPS) and 
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, has revolutionised industrial processes. Nevertheless, these 
improvements have also given rise to new issues, such as the vulnerability to cyber threats that 
exploit the IT aspect of CPS and IoT to compromise the functionality of the systems and the 
integrity and confidentiality of the generated data [1]. Operational Technology (OT) contains 
hardware and software that identify or cause modifications by monitoring and managing 
physical equipment and operations [2]. CPS are defined as combinations of computational 
systems that offer a deep interconnection with the associated physical entities and data-related 
functions accessed through the internet [3]. Hence, although the adoption of CPS and IoT offers 
many advantages concerning performance and productivity, this move expands cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities and attacks on OT.  
However, assessing systems on their susceptibility to cybersecurity threats is a complex process 
considering the number of known vulnerabilities and attacks. Relying solely on penetration 
testing techniques to identify them is not an option in OT, provided that availability is crucial 
for productivity. In the context of risk assessment, several attempts have been made to create a 
centralised and organised collection of the potential threats. This attempt has led to creating 
online security repositories available to the public that list and group the weaknesses, 
vulnerabilities, and attack patterns. Instances of such catalogues are the Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE) [4], Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [5], the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) [6], the Common Platform Enumerations (CPE) [7], and the 
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [8]. At the time of writing 
this thesis, these catalogues stored from 527 entries, as seen in CAPEC, to 153,838 entries, as 
seen in CVE, each containing numerous descriptive information that ranges from definitions to 
examples and mitigations. This amount of data and the general scope they cover make 
identifying the established relationships and mapping the relevant entries to a given system 
under evaluation challenging while limiting the process to manual tasks. Although the 
catalogues provide categories and the option of a word-based search, two main problems are 
still present. Firstly, using the search bar requires selecting the appropriate keywords for the 
system under evaluation to ensure that all the relevant entries are considered. Secondly, even if 
2 
 
the search bar is in use, the user must manually check numerous weaknesses, vulnerabilities, 
and attack patterns to identify the relevant information, which is a very time-consuming task, 
so an added filtering method is required.  
As a response to the rise of cybersecurity issues in OT, many companies and organisations have 
taken initiatives to mitigate the effects of these issues; such an example is the “Protecting 
Operational Technologies of Medium Enterprises from Cyber Risks” (PrOTectME) [9]. This 
project was set up aiming at the definition of the theory and development of methods to create 
a cyber risk estimation service for digitalised and IT/OT 4.0 companies, which contain direct 
and indirect assets that are affected by cyber risks. The end goal of ProTEctME is to provide an 
automatic risk assessment process for IT/OT systems of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and automatic financial estimation of the cascading effects that any cyber-related attack 
or incident can have on the enterprise. Apart from this atomisation, the project offers services 
that assist enterprises’ compliance to standards related to their respective fields. One of the tools 
created and employed in PrOTectME is ResilBlockly, a system-of-systems modelling tool [10]. 
1.2 Objectives  
Considering the problems identified in section 1.1, the main objective of this thesis is to provide 
a methodology that aims at simplifying and standardising the use of the online catalogues 
presenting the weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and attack patterns in the risk assessment of IT/OT 
systems.  
The design of the methodology is based on three sub-objectives, whose aims are:  
• To identify all the relevant relationships from the information in the online security 
catalogues  
• To present a mechanism through which users can directly connect information across 
different catalogues  
• To simplify and refine the mapping process between the assets of a system and the 
information found in the catalogues 
1.3 Proposed solution  
To achieve the goals listed in section 1.2, a methodology is proposed, as depicted in Figure 1.1.  
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Figure 1.1: Overview of the methodology1 
The methodology begins by hierarchically categorising the weaknesses and attack patterns 
found in CWE and CAPEC, respectively. The weaknesses employ the “ParentOf”-“ChildOf” 
relationship to provide the different levels of abstraction, while the attack patterns employ the 
“CanFollow”-“CanPrecede” relationship to present the path of attack patterns leading to an 
attack. After the online catalogues are organised, the assets are analysed and divided into 
components and subcomponents to simplify the user’s understanding of the security 
requirements with which each asset should be associated. The assets are initially characterised 
by the Foundational Requirements (FRs) found in ISA/IEC 62443-1-1 [11]. The assets under 
assessment are then connected to the CWE weaknesses and CAPEC attack patterns through the 
concept of security principles and the ISA/IEC 62443 standard. Security principles are defined 
as “distillations of experience designing, implementing, integrating, and upgrading systems that 
 
1 All the figures of this format are generated using MIRO. (http://www.miro.com/) 
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systems engineers and architects can use to guide design decisions and analysis” [12], 
particularly on issues of security determined by “speciality engineering disciplines”, according 
to “Cyber Resiliency Design Principles” technical report generated by MITRE. Another 
definition can be extracted by the “Design Principles for Security” technical report generated 
by SecureCore, where security principles are presented as “guidelines or rules that when 
followed during system design will aid in making the system secure” [13]. This definition 
closely aligns with the Technical Control System Requirements (SRs) found in ISA/IEC 62443-
3-3 [14], creating a link between security principles and the ISA/IEC 62443 standard. 
Hence, the next step is mapping the CWE weaknesses and CAPEC attack patterns to the SRs, 
using their mitigations, and identifying subcomponents that group the mitigations in more 
specific categories. Once the weaknesses are connected to the asset, they act as links to the 
related attack patterns, and the same process is repeated for the attack patterns. Furthermore, 
the CWE weaknesses are connected to the security principles through their mitigations to 
connect them to security patterns. Security patterns are defined as “particular recurring security 
problems that arise in a specific security context and present well-proven generic schemes for 
security solutions” [15], according to M. Schumacher. Each weakness is connected to one or 
more security patterns through the security principles linked to their mitigations. The 
weaknesses are further connected to the related vulnerabilities found in CVE. As the number 
of available vulnerabilities is significant, CPE is used to filter the relevant ones through their 
link to NVD. NVD has a dual role; on one side, it provides a direct connection to the CWE 
catalogue, and on the other side, it offers the severity of vulnerabilities as provided by the 
CVSS.  For each of the established connections, graphical representations are generated based 
on the concept of attack trees. Attack trees are tree-based Graphical Security Models (GrSM), 
which “graphically represent sets of attacks described in a hierarchical manner” [16][17]. The 
trees generated through the methodology present the hierarchical connection of weaknesses that 
lead to trees of sequential attack patterns. Similarly, the vulnerabilities can be presented based 
on their relationships to weaknesses. In order to test the methodology, the ICT Gateway use 
case provides its components as assessment targets to employ the methodology and evaluate its 
efficiency based on the results. 
1.4 Thesis organisation  
The rest of the thesis is organised into four categories, starting from the background information 
necessary to understand the designed methodology. The background information is explored in 
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chapter 2, which contains the presentation of the target system ResilBlockly, the online security 
catalogues, the relevant literature and the ISA/IEC 62443 standard. Chapter 3 presents the 
designed methodology, which includes the organisation of the weaknesses and attack patterns 
of CWE and CAPEC through the ISA/IEC standard, the filtering of the CVE vulnerabilities 
through CPE, their graphical representation and the potential application of the methodology in 
ResilBlockly. Chapter 4 combines the testing of the methodology on components of the ICT 
Gateway use case, the analysis of the results and a discussion on the impact on present and 
potential future applications. Lastly, chapter 5 contains the conclusion, which summarises the 
thesis. 
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2 Background  
This section provides insight into information used in the design and testing of the presented 
methodology. It introduces ResiBlockly, the target system of the methodology, the online 
security catalogues and their implementation in the ResilBlockly, and the relevant literature on 
which several concepts used in the methodology are based, such as academic papers and the 
ISA/IEC 62443 Standard. 
2.1 Target system ResilBlockly 
ResilBlockly is an updated version of the Blockly4SoS tool generated by the AMADEOS 
project [18]. ResilBlockly a tool that provides modelling, validation, query, and simulation 
functionalities for system-of-systems [19], focusing on cyber-physical systems. The tool offers 
two main features in the modelling phase: the “Profile Designer”, to design an abstract draft of 
the elements and their connection in a given environment, and the “Model Designer”, to 
specialise the “profile” to a particular event [10]. The profiles in the tool are created by utilising 
“building blocks” defined as “Class”, “Attribute”, “Relation”, “Menu”, and “Item Menu”, as 
seen Figure 2.1. This approach is based on the application of the “Blockly” library to the 
AMADEOS project [18].   
 
Figure 2.1: “Block” modelling elements used in ResilBlockly 
An essential functionality of ResilBlockly is the use of the “Risk Designer” found in the “Profile 
Designer”. This process begins with the design of the “profile” followed by the selection of the 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities that might render a given “Class” vulnerable. The selection 
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process of these threats is carried away with a “keyword” search over the information found in 
the CWE, CVE and CAPEC online security catalogues [10]. 
2.2 Online security catalogues 
The methodology that will be introduced in chapter 3 employs the information found in five 
interconnected online security catalogues that manage security concepts like weaknesses, 
vulnerabilities, and attack patterns. The catalogues are community developed and offer material 
on the security of both software and hardware. These catalogues are the Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE), the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD), the Common Platform Enumerations (CPE), and the Common 
Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC). 
2.2.1 Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) 
The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) is a “community-developed list of common 
software and hardware” weaknesses [4] managed by MITRE [20]. Weaknesses are defined as 
“flaws, faults, bugs, or other errors in software or hardware implementation, code, design, or 
architecture that if left unaddressed could result in systems, networks, or hardware being 
vulnerable to attacks” [4]. For example, “CWE-285: Improper Authorization”, 
described as the lack of or inaccurately executed authorization control by a given software when 
a user seeks access to resources or permission to perform an operation [21], is a weakness found 
in the CWE catalogue. The approach of CWE is preventative as it aims to eliminate potential 
vulnerabilities at their origin by mitigating software and hardware mistakes before their 
exploitation. The information found in this catalogue can be utilized either by accessing the 
online platform or downloading it. CWE, depending on whether the entire catalogue or one of 
the predefined groupings is required, can be extracted in XML, CVS, or HTML format. The 
weaknesses listed in CWE are displayed alongside descriptions, points, and areas of 
introduction in the target’s life cycle, consequences, mitigations, and detailed examples. 
Furthermore, connections are established to other related weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and 
attack patterns. 
2.2.2 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) 
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) is a public catalogue of the up-to-date 
identified cybersecurity vulnerabilities [5]. Such an example is “CVE-2021-28968”, 
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described as an XSS vulnerability identified in the “email” BBcode tag in PunBB before 1.4.6, 
which allows, under authentication, injection of arbitrary JavaScript into forum messages [22]. 
CVE is composed of listings of the vulnerabilities defined as CVE Records. CVE Records 
include three categories of information: CVE ID number, description of the vulnerability, and 
relevant references. The most notable piece of information found in CVE is the ID numbers, as 
they are utilized by “cybersecurity product and service vendors and researchers as a standard 
method for identifying vulnerabilities” [23]. The widespread use of these IDs directly links 
CVE to other online repositories, like the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and the 
Common Platform Enumerations (CPE). The listed information of CVE can be reached using 
the online platform or by downloading the information in CSV, HTML, Text, or XML format.   
2.2.3 National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is the “U.S. government repository of standards-
based vulnerability management data represented using the Security Content Automation 
Protocol (SCAP)” [6] managed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
[24]. In the NVD, each vulnerability has a description, an overview of its severity and the 
metrics that affect it, and further references to advisories, tools, and solutions. In addition, a 
connection is provided to related weaknesses found in CWE and affected software 
configurations found in CPE. The severity of a vulnerability in the NVD is determined using 
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [25]. CVSS is “an open framework for 
communicating the characteristics and severity of software vulnerabilities” managed by FIRST 
[26]. The CVSS score in the NVD provides the base score linked to the vulnerabilities’ “innate 
characteristics”. Two versions of CVSS standards are used in NVD, v2.0 and v3.X. The severity 
in CVSS v2.0 [27] can be “low”, “medium”, or “high”, while in CVSS v3.X [28], it can also 
be “none” or “critical”. The exploitability metrics used to generate the base score are different 
in the two versions as well, but the impact metrics, consisting of “confidentiality”, “integrity”, 
and “availability”, remain the same.  
Consequently, each vulnerability belongs to a severity category followed by a score between 0 
and 10 and a vector string of the exploitability and impact metrics. The CVE ID numbers 
directly connect NVD and CVE, but both catalogues are necessary for a complete database of 
information on vulnerabilities. NVD may provide a vast number of details on the 
vulnerabilities, but it includes only a fraction of the vulnerabilities found in CVE. The 
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information in NVD can be accessed through the online platform or downloaded in JSON 
format. 
2.2.4 Common Platform Enumerations (CPE) 
The Common Platform Enumerations (CPE) is a “structured naming scheme for information 
technology systems, software, and packages” [7] managed by NIST. CPE is derived from the 
“generic syntax” of the Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI). Hence, every entry consists of a 
“formal name format”, a method for checking names against a system, and a description pattern, 
which allows the association of text and tests to the name. More specifically, the CPE name is 
composed of numerous components that offer a more detailed description. Such components 
are the name, the vendor, the version, the update, and the edition. For example, 
“cpe:2.3:a:gnu:punbb:1.2.22:*:*:*:*:*:*:*” [29], as seen in Figure 2.2, is an 
entry of the CPE catalogue.  
 
Figure 2.2: CPE entry 
The public can access CPE as a dictionary, which provides online search or as an XML format. 
2.2.5 Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) 
The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) is a public “dictionary 
of known attack patterns” [8] managed by MITRE. It is a guide through the exploitation 
techniques employed by adversaries against weaknesses and “cyber-enabled capabilities”. For 
example, “CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction” 
is described as an attack that exploits anticipated session IDs, used in an activity to gain 
privileges and attempt spoofing or session hijacking attacks [30]. The attack patterns found in 
CAPEC provide an extensive description, an evaluation of the likelihood and severity of the 
attack, the required tools and skills to employ the attack successfully, the detailed attack steps 
to follow, their consequences and the potential mitigations. Apart from the individual overview, 
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CAPEC provides lists of related attack patterns and related CWE weaknesses. Similarly to 
CWE, the information collected in CAPEC can be accessed through the online platform or by 
downloading them in XML, CSV or HTML format. 
2.3 Relevant literature 
The online security catalogues considered in this work are widely used for industrial 
applications and research purposes. As a result, many approaches are considered to categorize 
and connect the information found in them. These methodologies range from semantic 
applications of the CWE and CAPEC catalogues [31] to the implementation of “Natural 
Language Processing Techniques” [32] to directly link the attack patterns of CAPEC to the 
CVE vulnerabilities. The methodology designed in this thesis is based on the work and research 
presented in the following papers that combine the relationships drafted in the catalogues with 
the implementation of the concepts of security principles and security patterns. 
2.3.1 Risk assessment  
Risk assessment of IT/OT systems is broadly guided by security standards, whose use in the 
latter offers compliance to the identified security requirements and detection and mitigation of 
the threats and risks that impact them. Portela et al. [33] have implemented these goals in the 
Dutch DSO Enexis by presenting a Cyber Security Management System (CSMS) that combines 
the ISA/IEC 62443 and ISO/ISA 27001 standards. The process that was followed is presented 
in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3: Cyber Security Management System Overview [33] 
Jelacic et al. [34] approach the potential need for Smart Grid OT Services to shift to a cloud-
based environment by establishing a basis for assessing the risks that such a move may present. 
This method implements the ISA/IEC 62443 standard to divide the system into security zones 
and identify the threats that impact its confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The attack 
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likelihood and severity levels are collected, creating a template for evaluating any Smart Grid 
system. An overview of this method is offered in Figure 2.4.  
 
Figure 2.4: Smart Grid Risk Assessment (adapted from [34]) 
Based on the risk severity of the services, the decision is made to move the low and medium 
risk services and evaluate the structure for the high-level ones. 
2.3.2 Semantic models 
Considering the issues that arise in selecting the appropriate weaknesses and attack patterns 
from the CWE and CAPEC catalogues, A.Brazhuk [31] proposes a semantic approach to 
organise and categorise the two catalogues and simplify the management of the significant 
number of entries they provide to the public. The semantic models are based on the information 
found CWE and CAPEC that describe characteristics like the method of detection of a 
weakness, such as “Manual analysis”, to the required skill level that an attacker should have to 
apply an attack pattern successfully, which ranges from “Low” to “High”. The implementation 
of these semantic models is achieved by representing them as a Web Ontology Language 
(OWL) ontology, from which information is extracted via Description Logics (DL) or Simple 
Protocol and Resource Description Framework Query Language (SPARQL) queries. The 
semantic model of CWE and CAPEC can been seen in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5: Semantic model of CWE and CAPEC [31] 
2.3.3 Ontology of Vulnerability Management (OVM) 
Wang et al. [35], motivated by the impact that vulnerabilities might have on the security of a 
system, drafted the Ontology for Vulnerability Management (OVM), which collects and applies 
attributes from security components of a system, like policies and countermeasures. This 
approach extracts data from online catalogues, like NVD, CVE, CPE, CWE and CAPEC, which 
map the potential threats and interactions. This mapping and an overview of the OVM is 
presented in Figure 2.6.  
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Figure 2.6: Ontology of Vulnerability Management Overview [35] 
2.3.4 Security graphs  
Online security catalogues like CWE, CVE and CAPEC manage information that belongs to 
different security concepts. However, the relationships between them are not readily evident to 
the users. To fill these gaps research is carried out by Xiao et al. [36], which provides a “security 
knowledge graph” that combines the weaknesses and attack patterns of CWE and CAPEC and 
the vulnerabilities of CVE. This approach, presented in Figure 2.7, serves a dual role, as it 
presents the links between the related security concepts and their instances and expands the 
security knowledge in predicting missing relationships in the entries of the security catalogues.  
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Figure 2.7: Security Knowledge Graph [36] 
Another approach of graphically representing the connection between the information found in 
public security catalogues is seen in the research completed by Hemberg et al. [37]. This study 
employs the CWE, CVE, NVD, CAPEC, CPE catalogues and the “Tactics” and “Techniques” 
of the MITRE ATT&CK [38] catalogue. The information extracted varies in abstraction level, 
but it offers connections that might lead from the most general to the most specific concept. 
The existing links between the data in the different catalogues are manipulated by a graph 
framework named “BRON”, which graphically generates these layered connections, as seen in 
Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8: BRON Graph Overview [37] 
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2.3.5 Risk-based Security Argumentation (RSA) 
The Risk Assessment in Security Argumentation (RISA) method, presented by Franqueira et 
al. [39], is employed to assist in the risk assessment process by applying the concept of 
argumentation in combination with the CWE, CVE, NVD and CAPEC security catalogues. 
RISA expands on the work provided by Haley et al. [40], which proposes connecting 
argumentation to risk assessment by presenting two types of arguments: the outer arguments 
that determine whether the operational environment of the system complies with its security 
requirements and the inner arguments which assess the validity of the outer arguments by 
challenging their basis. 
The main goals of RISA are: 
• to draft an approach that allows users to filter their decision with regard to the 
consequences of security risks and maintain a stable security level on their systems, and 
• to identify the risk of a system and expand the source of the risk to the arguments 
considered. 
The RISA method can be visualised in eight steps, as seen in Figure 2.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Overview of RSA Method [39] 
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2.3.6 Security patterns over CWE 
Based on the work seen in “A classification methodology for security patterns to help fix 
software weaknesses” [41], a mapping is introduced between weaknesses found in the CWE 
catalogue to security principles and security patterns. The study leads to a semi-automatic 
methodology to classify security patterns found in the literature to simplify their selection and 
application. This methodology is composed of seven steps, starting with the hierarchical 
organization of the security principles derived from literature, followed by extracting the 
weaknesses and their mitigations from the CWE catalogue. Then, the security principles 
collected are mapped to the mitigations of the weaknesses; the security patterns are linked to 
the identified strong points; and through the latter, the security principles get related to security 
patterns. Hence, a database is constructed from which a given weakness offers the relevant 
security patterns. The steps of this method are presented in Figure 2.10. 
 
Figure 2.10: Security patterns over CWE Overview (adapted from [41]) 
2.3.7 Security patterns over CAPEC 
The research presented in “A catalogue associating security patterns and attack steps to design 
secure applications” [42] is a continuation of the work presented in section 2.3.6, from the 
perspective of the attack patterns found in the CAPEC catalogue. The results obtained provide 
a semi-automatic methodology that leads to “Attack-Defense Trees” [43], graphically 
representing information on selected attacks and their potential mitigations.  This methodology 
contains eight steps, starting from the extraction of information on attacks from the CAPEC 
catalogue, followed by hierarchical clustering of countermeasures collected from the CAPEC 
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attack patterns, and a combination of the security patterns and the strong points selected. Then, 
the security principles are hierarchically organized and linked to the strong points and clustered 
mitigations. A database is created with the collected data that offers details on any chosen attack 
and the security patterns that offer potential solutions. This information can also be generated 
graphically, employing “Attack-Defense Trees”. The steps of this method are presented in 
Figure 2.11. 
 
Figure 2.11: Security Patterns over CAPEC Overview (adapted from [42]) 
2.4 ISA/IEC 62443 Standard 
The ISA/IEC 62443 standard is a standard drafted to manage the concept of cybersecurity in 
Industrial Automation and Control Systems. More specifically, the first part of the standard 
provides general insight into the target of the standard. There, the term “Industrial Automation 
and Control Systems (IACS)” is defined as the collection of “control systems used in 
manufacturing and processing plants and facilities, building environmental control systems, 
geographically dispersed operations such as utilities (i.e., electricity, gas, and water), pipelines 
and petroleum production and distribution facilities, and other industries and applications such 
as transportation networks, that use automated or remotely controlled or monitored assets [11].” 
The term “asset” in the ISA/IEC 62443 standard is used to define a system’s resources for which 
protection is deemed essential. Therefore, a set requirement is the identification and listing of 
all the assets of a target system. The assets are grouped into physical, logical and human, which 
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include the physical property of an organisation, the informational components associated with 
the operational functionality of the organisation, and the human element and their ability to 
perform critical tasks [11]. 
In order to describe security in IACS and the concepts that define it, some objectives are set. In 
information technology (IT), these goals are determined by the Confidentiality-Integrity-
Availability triad (CIA). However, IACS are more complicated systems, making the CIA model 
inadequate. A notable difference in the objectives of security in IT to the one in IACS is their 
priority. In IT, security objectives have the hierarchical order: confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. However, in IACS, the main objective is to preserve the availability followed by 
the integrity, as the highest risks in this domain are associated with the control and management 
of the system’s components. Confidentiality has the least priority, as the data analysed do not 
necessarily contain sensitive information. Hence, in the ISA/IEC 62443-1-1 [11] part of the 
standard, a more suitable alternative to the CIA model is presented for IACS. This model 
includes the following seven “Foundational Requirements”:  
1. The “Access Control (AC)” is the regulation of access to devices and information to 
preserve their examination only to authorised entities. 
2. The “Use Control (UC)” is the regulation of the use of devices and information to 
preserve their activities only to authorised entities. 
3. The “Data integrity (DI)” is the assurance of integrity for information found on 
communication channels to avoid unapproved modifications. 
4. The “Data Confidentiality (DC)” is the assurance of confidentiality of information 
found on communication channels to avoid unauthorised intrusion or monitoring. 
5. The “Restrict Data Flow (RDF)” is the regulation of the flow of information found in 
communication channels to avoid disclosure of sensitive material to unauthorised 
entities.  
6. The “Timely Response to Event (TRE)” is the ability to alert the responsible authority 
of violations identified by relaying notifications containing the required forensic 
evidence. This process should initiate an automatic mitigating response that repairs 
“mission critical or critical safety situations.” 
19 
 
7. The “Resource Availability (RA)” is the assurance of availability of all network 
resources to shield them from denial-of-service attacks. 
An overview of the ISA/IEC 62443 IACS model is visualised in Figure 2.12. 
 
Figure 2.12: ISA/IEC 62443 IACS model overview (adapted from [11]) 
As a system might have different sizes and levels of complexity, the security objectives will 
have to adapt to different levels of security. To achieve this categorisation, the ISA/IEC 62443 
standard presents the concept of “zones”, which are defined as “logical groupings of physical, 
informational, and application assets sharing common security requirements [11].” The 
boundaries between the elements included and excluded from the zone are determined using 
borders. Another essential concept defined is the “communication conduit” as “a particular type 
of security zone that groups communications that can be logically organised into a grouping of 
information flows within and also external to a zone” [11]. Within conduits, communication is 
established through links called “channels” that share the equivalent conduit’s security 
properties [11]. So, in order to generalise the concept of security from individual devices or 
systems to zones, the concept of security levels is presented, with three types [11]: 
1. The SL(Target) is the security level that a zone or conduit aims to achieve and is set 
during the risk assessment  
2. The SL(Achieved) is the security level that the zone or conduit managed to attain 
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3. The SL(Capability) is the security level that the countermeasures affiliated to a zone or 
conduct are capable of or the ‘inherent’ security level that devices or systems of a zone 
or conduit can reach  
Hence, a framework is presented that simplifies the decision-making process when 
countermeasures and devices with different security potential are concerned. 
The ISA/IEC 62443-3-3 [14] part of the standard provides the security requirements for the 
targeted system. More specifically, after the zones and conduits are identified for a given control 
system and their respective SLs are determined, the Technical Control System Requirements 
(SRs) and their Requirement Enhancements (REs) form the additional requirements. This leads 
to a checklist for the system’s security requirements, where the seven foundational requirements 
categorise the SRs. A partial representation of this list can be presented using the Identification 
and Authentication Control, also referred to as Access Control. This FR has four SL-Cs that 
aim to identify and authenticate all the users that attempt to access the system and vary from 
protection against unintentional unauthorised access without technical skills to protection 
against targeted attacks with the required technical skillset. One of the SRs of this AC is 
“Human user identification and authentication” defined as the “enforcement of identification 
and authentication on all interfaces which provide human user access to the control system to 
support segregation of duties and least privilege under applicable security policies and 
procedures” [14]. This SR can be enhanced in the following ways: “unique identification and 
authentication”, “multi factor authentication for untrusted networks”, and “multi factor 
authentication for all networks” [14]. 
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3 Designed methodology 
This chapter provides a detailed description of the methodology designed to apply the 
information provided by the online catalogues to the risk assessment process of IT/OT systems. 
The segment is divided into seven parts that offer an overview of the methodology, a thorough 
explanation of the individual steps and the tools employed in the process, a proposed updating 
process and the application of the methodology in the target system. 
3.1 Overview 
The designed methodology is a path from selecting the system to assess to presenting the related 
weaknesses, attack patterns, and vulnerabilities. Figure 3.1 offers an overview of the 
methodology. 
 
Figure 3.1: Overview of the methodology sections 
 
22 
 
The process can be described in four steps: 
1. Division of the system in assets and components 
2. Filtering of the CWE weaknesses and CAPEC attack patterns through the ISA/IEC 
62443 standard and security principles 
3. Filtering of the CVE vulnerabilities through the CPE and NVD 
4. Graphical representation of the relationships established between the relevant 
weaknesses, attack patterns and vulnerabilities 
3.2 Employed tools 
In designing the proposed methodology, the Talend, ADTool and KH Coder tools were 
employed to extract, map and cluster information and graphically represent the results of the 
identified connections. 
3.2.1 Talend Open Studio 
Talend Open Studio [44] is an open-source “extract, load, and transform” (ELT) tool that assists 
in Data Integration and Big Data analysis. It is Eclipse-based and is used to produce and run 
ELT Jobs. [45] In the methodology design, Talend is used in every task that requires data 
extraction or connection based on a list of requirements and generation of outputs in different 
formats. More specifically,  
1. Inputs are provided in XML, CSV, and Excel format 
2. “tMap”, a Talend component used to modify and lead data from one or more sources to 
numerous destinations [46], is employed to determine the required relationships 
between the inputs, or  
3. “tXMLMap”, a Talend component used to modify and lead XML data flow from one 
or more sources to numerous destinations [47], and  
4. Outputs are generated containing the mapped data in XML and CSV format  
In this process, the Talend Open Studio version 7.3 was used.  
3.2.2 Attack-Defense Tree Tool (ADTool) 
The Attack-Defence Tree Tool (ADTool) [48] is an open-source software created by the 
Security and Trust of Software Systems (SaToSS) group, part of the University of Luxemburg. 
ADTool is used to generate attack-defence trees that assist in graphical modelling and 
quantitative analysis. In the presented methodology, the concept of its use is expanded beyond 
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the attack-defence connection to comply with the identified relationships. It is critical to note 
that the changes are limited to the contextual use of the tool, as no technical alterations are 
implemented. The tool takes the XML files produced by Talend and generates a graphical 
representation of the relationships identified in the input.  
In this process, the ADTool version 1.4 was used. 
3.2.3 KH Coder 
KH Coder is a publicly available software for “quantitative content analysis or text mining”. 
[49] KH Coder is employed in the analysis process of the information found in the CWE and 
CAPEC catalogue to generate contextual clusters of the input data. The requirements set to the 
tool are the following:  
• Stanford POS Tagger for the data “PRe-Processing”, 
• Ward Method with Jaccard Distance and TF-IDF for the “Cluster Analysis” 
In this process, the KH Coder version 3 was used. 
3.3 Asset connection to CWE 
The starting point of the methodology is establishing a connection between the target's assets 
under evaluation and the weaknesses found in the CWE catalogue. This process is divided into 
five parts describing the sequential links leading from the identified assets to the relevant CWE 
weaknesses. These parts are: 1) the hierarchical organization of the CWE weaknesses, 2) the 
analysis of the system to identify the assets and their components, 3) the connection of the assets 
to the security requirements of the ISA/IEC 62443 standard, 4) the connection of standard to 
the weaknesses, and 5) the graphical representation of the results. 
3.3.1 CWE hierarchical organisation 
Based on the techniques and results examined in sections 2.3.6 and 2.3.7, the weaknesses found 
in CWE can be categorized based on the “Nature” of their relationship to other weaknesses. 
CWE defines eight such relationships: “ChildOf”, “ParentOf”, “MemberOf”, “CanFollow”, 
“CanPrecede”, “Requires”, “PeerOf” and “CanAlsoBe”. This methodology employs three of 
them to generate connections between the weaknesses at different stages of abstraction. The 
“ChildOf”, “ParentOf”, and “MemberOf” can lead to a hierarchical representation of the 
weaknesses from the most to least abstractly defined.  
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In order to work with the information extracted from the CWE catalogue using the connections 
generated from their relations, a database is created storing all the data extracted: 
• Using the XML version of the CWE catalogue as an input to Talend, the information 
related to the “ParentOf” - “ChildOf” are extracted.  
• As the “ParentOf” - “ChildOf” relationship is sequential, the different categories can be 
grouped to form “levels” of relationships.  
Hence, if a weakness is “ParentOf” but is not “ChildOf” of any weakness, the relationship 
would be part of “Level 0”. However, if a weakness that is “ChildOf” in a “Level 0” relationship 
is also a “ParentOf” of another weakness, the relationship would be part of “Level 1”, and the 
rest follow equivalently until there are no more “ParentOf” weaknesses. The database that stores 
these relationships is called “Hierarchical Weaknesses” database. An example of these 
relationships is provided in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Example of “Hierarchical Weaknesses” database 
3.3.2 Asset analysis  
Assuming that the target of the risk assessment process is a system, the first step is to identify 
the assets that compose it. As assets can be considered systems as well, the next step would be 
to identify their components. Each component is described based on a list of technical details 
that provide insight into its composition, functionality, requirements, and restrictions. These 
technical details are used to create sub-components for each component, which are 
representative details that are repeated throughout the components of the asset. This effect is 
enforced considering that some components are different versions of the same core component, 
allowing their division into categories. The sub-components identified are essential in the risk 
assessment process as they can be used to extract the relevant weaknesses, attack patterns and 
vulnerabilities for the components they are part of by using some of the information found in 
the technical details as reference. More specifically, after collecting the technical details for all 
the system components, the similarities are identified, and a list is extracted containing the 
unique sub-components for each category. As some of the subcomponents serve the same 
functionality on every component they are found in, identifying the weaknesses, attack patterns 
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and vulnerabilities associated with them is required only once. For the rest of the components, 
the results can be added automatically. If the functionality presents differences, then a base of 
common characteristics can be identified, limiting the number of weaknesses, attack patterns, 
and vulnerabilities to be checked for each component. Some categories of technical details, like 
libraries used for a given programming language, offer more detailed descriptions of the 
components and provide added sub-components or filters for the existing ones. 
3.3.3 Asset to ISA/IEC 62443 standard  
The assets of a system are connected to the ISA/IEC 62443 standard in two stages, as the entire 
asset and through the individual components. The mapping process starts by connecting the 
assets to the “Foundational Requirements” identified in the standard. As the FRs are general 
concepts, their relevance to the scenario under consideration is more evident. After the 
applicable FRs have been assigned to the assets, a more specialised mapping is enforced 
between the components of the asset and the “Technical Control System Requirements” derived 
from the selected FRs. Thus, for each component, the SRs relevant to the scenario under 
evaluation are assigned to them. This process is entirely manual, as it is based on the 
understanding of the assets, their components, and the security requirements that their 
functionality deems critical. The ISA/IEC 62443-3 lists seven FRs and fifty-one SRs divided 
among the FRs. So, the number of SRs that a user is required to consider depends on the relevant 
FRs. 
3.3.4 ISA/IEC 62443 standard to CWE 
Based on the definition of the security principles and the SRs, an assumption is made 
considering the SRs as security principles of the selected asset. However, security principles 
might contain one or more sub-principles that describe more detailed properties of the 
component. The security principles and the sub-principles act as links between the ISA/IEC 
62443 standard and the CWE weaknesses. This process is based on the approach seen in 
sections 2.3.6 and 2.3.7, as it exploits the mitigations of the weaknesses. Hence, the process is 
the following:  
1. Using the XML of the CWE catalogue as an input in Talend, the “descriptions” and the 
“strategies” of the mitigations of each weakness are extracted in relation to the CWE-
IDs. So, for “CWE-13: ASP.NET Misconfiguration: Password in 
Configuration File” [50], the potential mitigations “Credentials stored in 
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configuration files should be encrypted. Use standard APIs and industry accepted 
algorithms to encrypt the credentials stored in configuration files.” is extracted. 
2. The mitigations will be classified into sub-principles, creating a direct link between SRs 
and CWE weaknesses. Hence, CWE-13 is mapped to the “Use of Encryption” following 
the “Stored Data Encryption” and “Encrypted Credentials” sub-principles.  
3. The methodology has three automatic levels of classification, starting by grouping the 
mitigations based on their IDs (MIT-ID). 
4. The “Strategy” part of the mitigations is used to divide the entries further, based on the 
type of suggested countermeasure.  
5. The rest of the mitigations are hierarchically clustered through text mining based on 
their degree of similarity, using the KH Coder tool on the “descriptions” of the 
mitigations.  
6. As the classification is based on the context of the mitigations and the sub-principles, 
the final mapping demands manual contribution.  
7. For the weaknesses that do not have mitigations in CWE, the mapping is based on their 
descriptions. Such an example is “CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive 
Information” [51], linked to the “Information Confidentiality” SR. 
Following the clustering of the mitigations, each weakness in CWE is mapped to the relevant 
sub-principles and SRs. These connections, in turn, form a database that maps the SRs to the 
weaknesses through the sub-principles. 
Table 3.1: Number of categories and weaknesses 
Foundational Requirements 
Technical Control 
System Requirements 
Security  
Sub-principles Weaknesses 
1. Access Control 13 34 14 59 
2. Use Control 12 17 28 165 
3. Data integrity 9 90 51 538 
4. Data Confidentiality 3 26 25 107 
5. Restrict Data Flow 4 18 4 78 
6. Timely Response to Event 2 27 20 111 
7. Resource Availability 8 17 18 94 
This mapping simplifies the process for the user, as the initial filtering of the relevant 
weaknesses takes place with the selection of the above categories. More specifically, by 
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selecting the FRs, SRs and security sub-principles, the user limits the number of relevant 
weaknesses without analysing the individual weaknesses, as seen in Table 3.1. For that purpose, 
the connections between FRs, SRs and security sub-principles are mapped as seen in a partial 
representation in Figure 3.3. To be accessed and selected by the user, the CWE weaknesses are 
stored in the “CWE Security Principles” database mapped to the FRs, SRs and sub-principles 
they are related to. 
 
Figure 3.3: Categories of sub-principles derived from the ISA/IEC Standard 
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The filtering phase of the sub-principles is a combination of two steps as it allows the user to 
identify which of them are relevant to the asset while highlighting the ones already implemented 
in the asset as countermeasures. These steps remove the already mitigated weaknesses from the 
set of relevant weaknesses. Lastly, the user is asked to manually filter the identified weaknesses 
to check their compliance with the particular scenario by employing “keywords” to search for 
the required weaknesses. These “keywords” are extracted by the components, subcomponents 
and technical details describing the targeted asset.  
3.3.5 CWE hierarchical trees  
Based on the relationships identified in the catalogue study, four graphical tree versions were 
determined, one of which is the “Hierarchical Weakness Tree”. The “Hierarchical Weakness 
Tree” is a type of tree-based only on weaknesses, categorised on the “ParentOf” – “ChildOf” 
relationship. In this case, considering the level of the chosen weakness, the tree can be expanded 
in one or two directions. If the weakness is the root, the tree provides nodes and leaves related 
to it, but if the weakness is a node or a leaf, the tree provides both the root and any other related 
weaknesses. More specifically, 
• For each subcomponent, the identified weaknesses are mapped to the “ParentOf” 
weaknesses found in the “Hierarchical Weaknesses” database.  
• For each “ParentOf” weakness, the related “ChildOf” weaknesses are identified and 
filtered based on the weaknesses identified as relevant to the component.  
• A list of “ParentOf” – “ChildOf” weaknesses is extracted, where both categories are 
subsets of the identified weaknesses.  
• When a complete and filtered list is generated, the relationships are mapped to their 
respective levels.  
These relationships are identified and extracted using Talend.  
Based on the outcomes of the mapping of the identified weaknesses to the hierarchical 
relationships established by the CWE catalogue, the “Hierarchical Weakness Trees” can be 
categorized on two criteria: the number of directions the tree has to expand towards and whether 
the targeted weakness has “ParentOf” – “ChildOf” relationships. These criteria present four 
types of “Hierarchical Weakness Trees”:  
• The “1-Direction HWTs”, where the targeted weakness is provided with a tree that 
includes only “ChildOf” or “ParentOf” weaknesses related to it 
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• The “2-Directions HWTs”, where the targeted weakness is provided with a tree that 
includes both “ChildOf” and “ParentOf” weaknesses related to it 
• The “Full HWTs”, where all the weaknesses in the “Hierarchical Weakness Tree” are 
relevant to the targeted component, and  
• The “No parent HWTs”, where some weaknesses might not have a “ParentOf” 
weakness 
Based on the relationships established, one or more types of “Hierarchical Weakness Trees” 
are generated for the targeted weakness found in the subcomponent using the XML file 
extracted by Talend and the ADTool to print the tree. 
Figure 3.4 presents the incorrect management of access to resources of a software throughout 
its lifetime, from the most abstract “CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource 
Through its Lifetime” [52] to the most detailed “CWE-1273: Device Unlock 
Credential Sharing” [53]. 
 
Figure 3.4: Example of partial “Hierarchical Weakness Tree” 
3.4 Asset connection to CAPEC 
Once the weaknesses have been organized and connected to the assets, a mapping is established 
linking the identified weaknesses and the attack patterns of the CAPEC catalogue that can 
exploit them. This process is divided into four parts describing two graphical tree models that 
illustrate the paths leading from an attack to the exploitable weaknesses and their proposed 
mitigations. These parts are the hierarchical organization and classification of the CAPEC 
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attack patterns, the graphical representation of attack pattern chains, the link between CWE 
weaknesses and security patterns and the graphical representation including the weaknesses and 
security patterns to the chained attack paths. 
3.4.1 CAPEC hierarchical organisation  
Following the approach highlighted in section 3.3.1, the CAPEC attack patterns can be 
categorised based on the same relationships identified in the CWE weaknesses. The 
methodology employs two of the identified relationships to generate connections between the 
attack patterns at different stages of an attack. These relationships are the “CanFollow” and 
“CanPrecede”, which form attack pattern “chains” [54], where two or more attack patterns 
create a sequence in which one "can directly create the conditions that are necessary" to enable 
the exploitable properties of another attack pattern.   
• Using the XML version of the CAPEC catalogue as an input to Talend, the information 
related to the “CanPrecede” – “CanFollow” is extracted.  
• As the “CanPrecede” – “CanFollow” relationship is sequential as well, the different 
categories can be grouped to form the same types of relationship “levels” as the ones 
selected for the weaknesses.  
Therefore, the respective “Level 0” of the attack patterns represents the relationship between 
attack patterns that do not follow any other attack pattern to the attack patterns that precede 
them. The following levels represent the same type of relationship between “CanPrecede” – 
“CanFollow” attack patterns. The process is documented in a database containing all the 
assembled attack pattern “chains” characterised by the level of their relationship. This database 
is called the “Attack Pattern chains” database. Furthermore, by using the relationship between 
CWE weaknesses and CAPEC attack patterns, the “CWE-CAPEC” database can be extracted 
from Talend, containing this relationship. Hence, paths can be formed from the attack pattern 
“chains” to the related weaknesses by combining the connections presented in the two 
databases, leading to the “Attack Paths” database. An example of these relationships is provided 
in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5: Example of “Attack Paths” database 
3.4.2 ISA/IEC 62443 standard to CAPEC 
Following the same process described in section 3.3.4, the attack patterns found in CAPEC can 
be classified based on the FRs and SRs of the ISA/IEC 62443 standard and the concept of 
security principles. More specifically,  
1. Using the XML of the CAPEC catalogue as an input in Talend, the “descriptions” of 
the mitigations of each attack pattern are extracted in relation to the CAPEC-IDs. So, 
for “CAPEC-383: Harvesting Information via API Event Monitoring” 
[55], the potential mitigations “Leverage encryption techniques during information 
transactions so as to protect them from attack patterns of this kind.” is extracted. 
2. The mitigations will be classified into sub-principles, creating a direct link between SRs 
and CAPEC attack patterns. Hence, CAPEC-383 is mapped to the “Use of Encryption”, 
defined as “Use cryptographic algorithms, key sizes and mechanisms for key 
establishment and management according to commonly accepted security industry 
practices and recommendations” [14] following the “Transited Data Encryption” sub-
principles.  
3. As CAPEC does not have “strategies” and mitigations IDs, the mitigations are 
hierarchically clustered through text mining based on their degree of similarity, using 
the KH Coder tool on the “descriptions” of the mitigations.  
4. As the classification is based on the context of the mitigations and the sub-principles, 
the final mapping demands manual contribution. 
5. The mapping is based on their descriptions for the attack patterns that do not have 
mitigations in CAPEC. Such an example is “CAPEC-629: Unauthorized Use of 
Device Resources,” [56] linked to the “Authorization Enforcement” SR. 
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Following the clustering of the mitigations, each attack pattern is mapped to the relevant sub-
principles and SRs. These connections, in turn, form a database that maps the SRs to the 
weaknesses through the sub-principles. Hence, another database named “CAPEC Security 
Principles” is generated to store the CAPEC attack patterns mapped to the FRs, SRs and sub-
principles they are related to. 
This mapping has the same advantages for the user, as mentioned in section 3.3.4. Hence, the 
user filters the attack patterns by selecting the FRs, SRs and security sub-principles and 
manually selects the relevant ones based on their compliance with the particular scenario. The 
“keywords” employed for the search are the same ones extracted by the components, 
subcomponents, and technical details to identify the weaknesses.  
3.4.3 CAPEC chain trees 
Another version of the graphical tree identified is the “Attack Path Tree”. The “Attack Path 
Tree” is a type of tree that provides a listing of the potential paths that an attacker can follow to 
exploit a weakness by exploiting the established relationship between the CWE and CAPEC 
catalogues. The roots are the targeted weaknesses, and the nodes and leaves represent the related 
attack pattern “chains”, connected through the “CanPrecede” – “CanFollow” relationship and 
the CAPEC “Steps” that lead to each attack. The process of generating “Attack Path Trees” 
maps the assets, through their subcomponents, to the attack pattern that can exploit their 
weaknesses.  
1. The attacks identified as relevant to the subcomponent are mapped to the initial attack 
patterns of the “chains”.   
2. The extracted weaknesses are linked to the related attack pattern “chains” found in the 
“Attack Paths” database, and taking advantage of the hierarchical relationship of the 
weaknesses, a subset is extracted limited to the ones characterised as either only 
“ChildOf” or “ParentOf” without identified “children” weaknesses.  
3. As not all attack patterns form “chains”, the identified ones are connected to the relevant 
weaknesses using the relationship marked in the “CWE-CAPEC” database.  
Hence the generated “Attack Path Trees” provide the paths that reach the least abstract level of 
weaknesses in “ParentOf”-“ChildOf” relationships found in their hierarchical categorisation. 
Additionally, as there are attack patterns that are not connected to a weakness in CWE, these 
attack patterns are categorised as “Without identified weakness” results formed by Talend, as 
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all the rest of the individual steps. Therefore, based on the relationships established, there are 
three versions of the “Attack Path Tree”: 
1. The “APTs based on attack pattern chains” provide a complete path from an attack 
pattern to the weaknesses targeted for exploitation. 
2. The “Single attack pattern APTs” rely on direct connections between weaknesses and 
related attack patterns, and  
3. The “No weakness APTs” focus on attack patterns that lack a connection to any 
weakness found in the CWE catalogue. 
Based on the relationships established, one or more types of “Attack Path Trees” are generated 
for the targeted connection between weaknesses and attack patterns found in each 
subcomponent using the XML file extracted by Talend and the ADTool to print the tree. 
Figure 3.6 presents that the unauthorised exposure of device unlocking credentials (“CWE-
1273: Device Unlock Credential Sharing”) can be exploited by the “CAPEC-560: 
Use of Known Domain Credentials” [57] attack pattern, which is achieved by using 
“CAPEC-55: Rainbow Table Password Cracking” [58] or “CAPEC-70: Try Common 
or Default Usernames and Passwords” [59].  
 
Figure 3.6: Example of partial “Attack Path Tree” 
3.4.4 Security patterns mapping  
Considering the number of weaknesses, attack patterns and their respective mitigations, security 
patterns provide a potential alternative to mitigating individual threats. Based on the results 
examined in sections 2.3.6 and 2.3.7, security principles provide a link between CWE 
weaknesses, CAPEC attack patterns and security patterns. 
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From publicly available online catalogues, [60][61][62][63] attack patterns were extracted and 
manually mapped to SRs or security principles or different abstraction, offering a link to CWE 
weaknesses. In this methodology, the attack patterns are connected to CWE, as according to 
CAPEC, the attack patterns are only viable if the related weaknesses exist in the targeted asset. 
For instance, “CWE-653: Insufficient Compartmentalization” [64] offers as the 
potential mitigation “Break up privileges between different modules, objects or entities. 
Minimize the interfaces between modules and require strong access control between them.”. 
This mitigation is mapped to the “Authorization Enforcement” SR through the “Separation of 
Principles” sub-principle. Hence, a security principle connected to CWE-653 is “Privilege 
Separation”, defined as the division of “one functional element into smaller functional elements 
with different privileges and restricted interfaces” [65].  
Figure 3.7 offers a partial representation of the FRs, SRs and the related security patterns. 
 
Figure 3.7: Example of “Privilege Separation” security pattern [65] 
3.4.5 Attack-Defense trees  
The last version of the graphical trees identified is the “Attack-Defense Tree”. The “Attack-
Defense Tree” is an expansion of the “Attack Path Tree”, with the addition of the related 
weaknesses of the “Attack Path Tree” nodes and their security patterns. Hence, the process of 
generating “Attack-Defense Trees” maps the attack paths of an asset to the weaknesses that 
define them and their potential mitigations in the form of security patterns.  
1. For each of the attacks contained in the attack paths, the related weaknesses are 
identified using the relationship marked in the “CWE-CAPEC” database, and  
2. For each of the weaknesses, the related security patterns are identified.  
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Therefore, based on the relationships established, an “Attack-Defense Tree” is generated using 
the XML file extracted by Talend and the ADTool to print the tree. 
 
Figure 3.8: Example of partial “Attack-Defense Tree” 
Figure 3.8 presents the security patterns that potentially mitigate “CWE-1273: Device 
Unlock Credential Sharing” and “CWE-521: Weak Password Requirements” 
[66]. The “Authenticator” security pattern is defined as “the problem of how to verify that a 
subject is who it says it is” [62], and the “Password Design and Use” security pattern is defined 
as “the best practice for designing, creating, managing, and using password components” [62]. 
3.5 Asset connection to CVE 
Once the weaknesses and the attack patterns have been connected to the assets under evaluation, 
the related vulnerabilities in CVE and NVD catalogues are extracted. This process is achieved 
using the CPE catalogue to filter the vulnerabilities and graphically represent their relationship 
to CWE weaknesses. 
3.5.1 CPE and NVD to CVE 
Following the weaknesses and attack patterns, the CVE vulnerabilities are linked to the assets. 
The “keyword” search process is adopted utilising the exact keywords used for the weaknesses 
and attack patterns. However, the process is connected to CPE by adding information on the 
name, vendor, version and update of each subcomponent. More specifically,  
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1. Using the XML form of the CWE catalogue as input in Talend, extract the CVE 
vulnerabilities and the related CWE weaknesses. 
2. Extract the vulnerabilities found in CVE and their “descriptions.” 
3. Map the vulnerabilities of the CWE to the “descriptions” extracted from CVE.  
4. Extract the vulnerabilities found in NVD and the related CPE entries and the related 
weaknesses.  
5. Extract the name, vendor, version and updates of each entry in CPE. 
6. Map the vulnerabilities to the information extracted by CPE  
7. Connect all the extracted information and store them in a “CVE-NVD-CPE” database. 
This process limits the number of vulnerabilities the user needs to filter manually and it can be 
expanded by extracting the severity levels and characteristics of the vulnerabilities as calculated 
by versions 2 and 3 of CVSS. Therefore, taking advantage of the connections identified, a link 
is determined between CVE weaknesses and the information provided by CVSS. 
3.5.2 CWE/CVE/NVD relationship trees  
Another version of the graphical trees identified is the “Weakness-Vulnerability Tree”. The 
“Weakness-Vulnerability Tree” is a type of tree that takes advantage of the relationship found 
in CWE between the weaknesses and the vulnerabilities found in CVE and NVD. In this tree, 
the root is the weakness, and the connected vulnerabilities are the leaves. The process of 
generating this tree is the following: 
1. Extraction of the CWE weaknesses and the related CVE vulnerabilities linked through 
the CWE catalogue and their storage into the “CWE-CVE” database 
2. Mapping the weaknesses identified for the subcomponents of the asset to the “CWE-
CVE” database, the related CVE vulnerabilities are exported and can be linked to the 
CVE catalogue to extract the specific descriptions of the vulnerabilities 
3. Reversion and repeat the extraction phase for the vulnerabilities generated from the 
CVE catalogue 
4. Instead of using the weaknesses to identify the related vulnerabilities, the vulnerabilities 
are used to identify the weaknesses found in the same CWE relationships 
5. As several vulnerabilities of CVE might be identified without a connection to the CWE 
weaknesses, the mapping process is repeated using the NVD catalogue, which provides 
connections between the vulnerabilities and the weaknesses in CWE. 
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Due to the generality of the weaknesses, the related vulnerabilities might cover broad concepts 
which are not necessarily relevant to the component they identified with, so the outcomes 
should be filtered based on the given scenario.  
This process can be achieved semi-manually by using the CPE catalogue. Provided that the user 
has the name, vendor, version, update or all three for each subcomponent, the CPE can reduce 
the number of results of vulnerabilities and manually filter the rest.  
Hence, based on the relationships established, there are two forms of the “Weakness-
Vulnerability Tree”: 
• The “Full WVTs”, where the vulnerabilities are connected to a relevant weakness 
through the CWE relationship or the NVD catalogue, and  
• The “No weakness WVTs”, where the vulnerabilities are not related to any weakness 
through the CWE relationship or the NVD catalogue.  
Based on the relationships established, one or more types of “Weakness-Vulnerability Tree” 
are generated for the targeted connection between weaknesses and attack patterns found in the 
subcomponent using the XML file extracted by Talend and the ADTool to print the tree. A 
partial example of the “Weakness-Vulnerability Tree” is seen in Figure 3.9.  
 
Figure 3.9: Example of partial “Weakness-Vulnerability Tree” 
3.6 Updating process 
The proposed methodology might offer the user a more manageable identification mechanism 
of the weaknesses, vulnerabilities, attack patterns, and relationships formed among them; 
however, the information it employs should be simply updatable for the methodology to be 
practical in the long term. Firstly, the updating process can be divided into two categories based 
on the part of the methodology that is being updated. As the databases employed in the 
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methodology store information extracted from the online catalogues, their updates are linked to 
the updates of the online repositories. Hence, the updating process can be achieved in three 
steps: 
1. Download the new versions of the security catalogues in the required format (XML, 
CSV, JSON, or HTML) 
2. Input the downloaded versions of the catalogues in the Talend mappings created, and 
extract the updated databases  
3. Replace the old databases with the new ones  
Due to the automated form of these steps, the updating process is completed in minutes.  
The second category focuses on updating the databases containing the classification of 
weaknesses and attack patterns based on the security principles, and security patterns are 
equally simple, but they are semi-automated. The automated part follows the algorithm seen in 
Figure 3.10, where based on the “Security Principles” databases of the current version of CWE 
or CAPEC, the new versions of the catalogues are compared and linked to the relevant groups. 
Algorithm: Update 
1. Upload DB_v.4.3, DB_v.4.4 
2. Declare new_DB_v.4.4  
3. For x in DB_v.4.4: 
4.        For y in DB_v.4.3:  
5.               If x = y:  
6.                   Add x to new_DB_v.4.4  
7.                   Add the security principles of y to new_DB_v.4.4 for x 
8.                   Remove x from DB_v.4.4 
9. Download new_DB_v.4.4, DB_v.4.4 
Figure 3.10: Algorithm of updating process of “Security Principles” database 
Once the information that differs between the versions of the catalogues have been identified, 
they can be manually allocated to the categories they fit in better. The automated part of this 
process is completed in seconds, while the manual section depends on the number of new or 
updated entries. 
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3.7 Methodology in ResilBlockly 
This methodology can be applied to ResilBlockly partially or as a whole. The connection can 
be identified in three levels: 
• The modelling phase divides the system into components with the use of “Classes” and 
provides the user with all the information they require to determine the technical 
requirements and security configurations.  
• As the selection of the weaknesses and the vulnerabilities is based on online security 
catalogues, the categorisation of this information, based on the relationships established 
among the catalogues and their connections to security standards like the ISA/IEC 
62443 Standard, can provide an automated filtering phase based on the characteristics 
of the modelled systems.  
• Lastly, considering the number of threats that a system composed of several components 
may contain, a graphical representation of the weaknesses, attack patterns, and 
vulnerabilities identified will provide a deeper understanding for the end-user and the 
opportunity for the conductor of the assessment to verify that all the information is 
relevant and complete.  
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4 Testing and result analysis  
This section is devoted to the testing of the designed methodology seen in chapter 3. The testing 
is applied on the ICT Gateway use case and the updating process from one version of catalogues 
to the other. After the testing is completed, the presented results are analysed and an evaluation 
of the methodology is provided, highlighting the successful points and the issues that arose. 
4.1 Use case: ICT Gateway 
The ICT Gateway is the use case chosen to test the designed methodology. Taking advantage 
of the fact that every component of the ICT Gateway is considered an individual system, the 
risk assessment is deployed on the assets of the latter by analysing their characteristics and 
functionalities. 
4.1.1 Introduction  
ICT Gateway is a medium among data collection actuation subsystems and domain operations 
in the context of Smart Grids. The system provides a supportive environment for data, 
configuration, and control flows [67]. 
 
Figure 4.1: Architecture of ICT Gateway [68] 
41 
 
Figure 4.1 presents a “high-level architectural description” where the interacting 
subcomponents are positioned inside and outside the ICT Gateway environment [68]. 
In this thesis, the testing of the designed methodology is presented on two components 
identified in the ICT Gateway system. The chosen components are the “Graphical User 
Interface” and the “Security & Resilience”. 
Table 4.1 lists the technical characteristics of the components determined as the “programming 
languages”, the “communication protocols”, the “security configurations”, the “libraries”, and 
the “interfaces”. 
Table 4.1: Technical Characteristics of ICT Gateway components 
Technical Characteristics Graphical User Interface Security & Resilience  
Programming Languages 
TypeScript 
(Angular 8 Framework) 
Java 
Communication Protocols 
HTTP HTTP 
MQTT MQTT 
 
Interfaces  
HTTP REST API HTTP REST API 
MQTT Broker MQTT Broker 
MySQL Connector Bridge 
 
Object-Relational Mapping (ORM) 
Hibernate 
 
Libraries Bootstrap 4 
 
Security Configurations Sec-3, Sec-4 Sec-3, Sec-4 
In order to avoid any security breaches, the weaknesses, attack patterns and vulnerabilities 
explored in this thesis are connected to the assumption that adequately implemented security 
requirements [68] are not present. More specifically, it is assumed that ICT Gateway lacks the 
following security measures: 
• Sec-03, that requires any internal communication to be protected by authentication and 
encryption mechanisms  
• Sec-09, that requires ICT Gateway to detection mechanisms that ensure the integrity of 
the managed data 
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4.1.2 Component 1: Graphical User Interface  
The “Graphical User Interface (GUI)” [68] component is a means of interaction between the 
“Distribution System Operators (DSO)” and the system. GUI offers input and visual output for 
ICT Gateway processes. GUI communicates with other components through Message Queuing 
Telemetry Transport (MQTT) and HTTP Representational State Transfer (REST) API. MQTT 
is a “publish/subscribe lightweight messaging protocol” [69], and HTTP REST API is a web 
server linking a client to a system’s information and processes based on the technical 
description of the World Wide Web’s functionality [70]. The DSO and the ICT Gateway reach 
GUI through HTTP REST API, and it obtains updates of the status of ICT Gateway through the 
MQTT Broker. 
The testing of the methodology begins by analysing the target system and manually identifying 
its components. Considering the GUI as the target system, the identified technical 
characteristics seen in Table 4.1 represent the components, also known as assets. After the 
components have been analysed, the filtering process of the weaknesses and the attack patterns 
is carried away through the security principles. Hence, the FRs are manually selected for the 
GUI as a whole from the “CWE Security Principles” database, followed by selecting the SRs 
for the separate components.   
Table 4.2 presents the identified FRs of the GUI as a whole, and Table 4.3 presents the identified 
SRs for each of the GUI components.  
Table 4.2: FRs filtering of the GUI system 
Foundational Requirements Technical Control System Requirements 
Access Control 
Software Process and Device Identification and 
Authentication 
Use Control Authorization Enforcement 
Data Confidentiality Use of Cryptography 
Data Integrity 
Communication Integrity 
Input Validation 
Deterministic Output 
Software and Information Integrity 
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Table 4.3: SRs filtering of the GUI system 
Technical Control 
System Requirements Typescript 
HTTP 
REST API 
MQTT 
Broker ORM 
Software Process and Device 
Identification and Authentication 
X X X  
Authorization Enforcement X X X 
 
Use of Cryptography X X X 
 
Communication Integrity X X X 
 
Input Validation X 
  
X 
Deterministic Output X 
   
Software and Information Integrity X 
   
 
Hence, the programming language (Typescript) is used to filter all the weaknesses identified 
for GUI, the SRs of authentication, authorization and encryption are linked to MQTT Broker 
and HTTP REST API, input validation is linked to ORM while the functionalities of GUI filter 
the rest. After the FRs and SRs are selected, the security principles for every abstraction level 
are filtered, and the relevance of the resulting weaknesses is evaluated through the use of 
keywords extracted from the technical characteristics and GUI and its functionality, some of 
which are: HTTP, HTTP REST, MQTT, ORM and Hibernate. The sub-principles are manually 
filtered, providing a set of relevant weaknesses while the filtering by keywords is done semi-
automatically by extracting from the “CWE Security Principles” database only the weaknesses 
that contain the keywords.  
Table 4.4 presents the selected security principles and examples weaknesses identified in the 
process. Each level of the sub-principles contains several weaknesses, and they are filtered by 
the component they are connected to in Table 4.3 or the descriptions of their functionalities. 
As Table 4.4 represents the potential weaknesses of GUI based on its description, the last part 
of this phase is to remove the already mitigated ones, which is semi-automated mechanism as 
the manual selection of implemented mitigations leads to the automatic removal of the 
weaknesses it affects. The process is repeated for the attack patterns following the same steps, 
and after the relationships between the related weaknesses and attack patterns have been 
established, all the relevant information is stored in a database. 
44 
 
Table 4.4: Weakness filtering of the GUI system 
Security Sub-Principles 
Filtered 
Weaknesses 
Communications Channel 
Authentication 
Double-sided Authentication 
CWE-300 
Authentication Framework/Library 
 
CWE-307 
Source Authentication 
 
CWE-441 
Access Control Authorization Permissions Assignment  CWE-77 
Principles of Least Privilege 
 
CWE-89 
Separation of Privileges 
 
CWE-15 
Transited Data Encryption Communication Channel 
Encryption 
CWE-319 
Cryptographic Algorithm Management 
 
CWE-327 
Protected Communication 
 
n/a 
Input Validation Allowlists and Denylists n/a 
User-controlled Input Validation 
 
n/a 
Output Encoding 
Allowlists and Denylists n/a 
Consistent Output Encodings n/a 
The process of identifying the vulnerabilities of GUI is completed by utilizing the information 
of the employed components. In this case, the focus will be on the “Bootstrap 4” library and the 
“Object-Relational Mapping (ORM) Hibernate” interface. To avoid jeopardizing the security 
of the system, random versions are chosen to apply the methodology. Based on the information 
extracted by CPE, the following are provided as input to generate the related CVE 
vulnerabilities: 
• Vendor: Hibernate / GetBootstrap 
• Product: Hibernate ORM / Bootstrap  
• Version: 3.6.0 / 4.0.0 
• Update: Beta 4 / Alpha 
Hence, the user sets the above information as a request to the “CVE-CPE” database, which 
maps the CPE characteristics to the CVE vulnerabilities through NVD, and the list of relevant 
CVE vulnerabilities is generated automatically. After the CVE vulnerabilities are extracted, 
they are linked to the related CWE weaknesses through NVD and then combined with the ones 
45 
 
extracted from the CWE catalogue. This process is done automatically using Talend which 
maps the extracted information to the stored data in the “NVD vulnerabilities” and “CWE 
weaknesses” databases. Table 4.5 provides the collected results and CVSS severity levels found 
in NVD.  
Table 4.5: Vulnerabilities of GUI 
Employed Catalogues Weaknesses Vulnerabilities CVSS (v.3, v.2) 
CPE, NVD 
CWE-89 
CVE-2020-25638 7.4, 5.8 
CPE, NVD CVE-2019-14900 6.5, 4.0 
CPE, NVD 
CWE-79 
CVE-2018-14042 6.1, 4.3 
CPE, NVD CVE-2018-14041 6.1, 4.3 
CPE, NVD CVE-2018-14040 6.1, 4.3 
 
Once all the information is collected, the graphical representations of their relationships are 
automatically generated using Talend for the XML file and ADTool for the graphical trees. 
Figure 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 present the “Hierarchical Weakness Tree” for “CWE-330: Use of 
Insufficiently Random Values” [71], the “Attack Path Tree” leading to “CWE-1204: 
Generation of Weak Initialization Vector (IV)” [72], which is a leaf of the 
previous tree, and the respective “Attack-Defense Tree”. Figure 4.5 presents the “Weakness-
Vulnerability Tree” for the “CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special 
Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')” [73] weakness of the 
“Hibernate ORM”. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: “Hierarchical Weakness Tree” for “CWE-330” 
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Figure 4.3: “Attack Path Tree” leading to “CWE-1204” 
 
Figure 4.4: “Attack-Defense Tree” of “CWE-1204” 
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Figure 4.5: “Weakness-Vulnerability Tree” of “CWE-89” 
4.1.3 Component 2: Security and Resilience  
The “Security and Resilience (S&R)” [68] component is a software module, individually 
positioned outside of the ICT Gateway frame, whose aim is to supervise the system and identify 
any functionality issues that may occur.  S&R collaborates with the “Event Generation & 
Correlation (EGC)” to establish a safe, resilient, and robust environment through detection 
processes of faults and attacks. S&R communicates with other components through MQTT and 
HTTP REST API. S&R functions by alerting the DSO on GUI through MQTT and extracting 
the identified anomalies from EGC and the “Data Access API” through HTTP REST API. 
The exact process is repeated for the S&R, so considering it as the target system, the identified 
technical characteristics in Table 4.1 represent the components. After the components have been 
manually analysed, the filtering process of the weaknesses and the attack patterns is carried 
away through the security principles. Hence, the FRs are selected for the S&R as a whole, 
followed by selecting the SRs for the separate components.  
Table 4.6 presents the identified FRs of the S&R as a whole, and Table 4.7 presents the 
identified SRs linked to the components of S&R. 
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Table 4.6: FRs filtering of the S&R system 
Foundational Requirements Technical Control System Requirements 
Access Control  
Software Process and Device Identification and 
Authentication 
Use Control  Authorization Enforcement  
Data Confidentiality  Use of Cryptography 
Data integrity 
Communication Integrity 
Error Handling  
Security Functionality Verification 
Restrict Data Flow Zone Boundary Protection 
Timely Response to Event Continuous Monitoring 
 
Table 4.7: SRs filtering of the S&R system 
Technical Control  
System Requirements Java 
HTTP  
REST API 
MQTT 
Broker 
Software Process and Device 
 Identification and Authentication 
X X X 
Authorization Enforcement  X X X 
Use of Cryptography X X X 
Communication Integrity X X X 
Error Handling  X 
  
Security Functionality Verification X 
  
Zone Boundary Protection X 
  
Continuous Monitoring X 
  
Hence, the programming language (Java) is used to filter all the weaknesses identified for S&R, 
the SRs of authentication, authorization and encryption are linked to MQTT Broker and HTTP 
REST API, while the rest are filtered by the functionalities of S&R. After the FRs and SRs are 
manually selected, the security principles for every abstraction level are filtered, and the 
relevance of the resulting weaknesses is semi-automatically evaluated through the use of 
keywords extracted from the technical characteristics and S&R and its functionality, some of 
which are: HTTP, HTTP REST, and MQTT.  
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Table 4.8 presents a subset of the selected security principles and examples of weaknesses 
identified in the process. Each level of the sub-principles contains several weaknesses, and they 
are filtered by the component they are connected to in Table 4.1 or the descriptions of their 
functionalities. 
Table 4.8: Weakness filtering of the S&R 
Security Sub-Principles 
Filtered 
Weaknesses 
Communications Channel 
Authentication 
Double-sided Authentication 
CWE-300 
Authentication Framework/Library 
 
CWE-307 
Source Authentication 
 
CWE-441 
Access Control Authorization Permissions Assignment  CWE-77 
Principles of Least Privilege 
 
CWE-89 
Separation of Privileges 
 
CWE-15 
Transited Data Encryption Communication Channel 
Encryption 
CWE-319 
Cryptographic Algorithm 
Management 
 
CWE-327 
Protected Communication 
 
n/a 
Error Detection Warnings  n/a 
Error Messages     Default Error Messages n/a 
Configuration Evaluation 
 
n/a 
Protocols Evaluation 
 
n/a 
Software Zone Separation 
 
n/a 
Attack Surface Reduction 
 
n/a 
Behavior Monitoring  
 
n/a 
Certificate Monitoring  
  
As Table 4.8 represents the potential weaknesses of S&R based on its description, the last part 
of this phase is to semi-automatically remove the already mitigated ones. The process is 
repeated for the attack patterns following the same steps and after the relationships between the 
related weaknesses and attack patterns have been established, all the relevant information is 
stored in a database.  
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The process of identifying the vulnerabilities of S&R is completed by utilizing the information 
of the employed components. In this case, the focus will be on the chosen MQTT Broker. To 
avoid jeopardizing the security of the system, the “Eclipse Mosquitto” broker is chosen at 
random to apply the methodology. Based on the information extracted by CPE, the following 
are provided as input to generate the related CVE vulnerabilities: 
• Vendor: Eclipse  
• Product: Mosquitto  
• Version: 1.5  
After the CVE vulnerabilities are semi-automatically extracted using CPE, they are linked 
automatically to the related CWE weaknesses through NVD and then combined with those 
extracted from the CWE catalogue, using Talend. Table 4.9 provides the collected results and 
CVSS severity levels found in NVD.  
Table 4.9: Vulnerabilities of S&R 
Employed Catalogues Weaknesses Vulnerabilities CVSS (v.3, v.2) 
CPE, NVD CWE-754 CVE-2019-11779 6.5, 4.0 
CPE, NVD CWE-287 CVE-2018-12551 8.1, 6.8 
CPE, NVD CWE-440 CVE-2018-12550 8.1, 6.8 
CPE, NVD CWE-284 CVE-2018-12546 6.5, 4.0 
CPE, NVD CWE-732 CVE-2018-20145 7.5, 5.0 
CVE, NVD CWE-20 CVE-2019-5432 7.5, 5.0 
Once all the information is collected, the graphical representations of their relationships are 
automatically generated using Talend for the XML file and ADTool for the graphical trees. 
Figure 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 present the “Hierarchical Weakness Tree” for “CWE-284: Improper 
Access Control” [74], the “Attack Path Tree” leading to “CWE-307: Improper 
Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts” [75], which is a leaf of the 
previous tree, and the respective “Attack-Defense Tree”. Figure 4.9 presents the “Weakness-
Vulnerability Tree” for the “CVE-2019-11779” [76] vulnerability of the “Eclipse Mosquitto” 
MQTT Broker. 
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Figure 4.6: “Hierarchical Weakness Tree” for “CWE-284” 
 
 
Figure 4.7: “Attack Path Tree” leading to “CWE-307” 
52 
 
 
Figure 4.8: “Attack-Defense Tree” of “CWE-307” 
 
Figure 4.9: “Weakness-Vulnerability Tree” of “CVE-2019-11779” 
4.2 Updating process 
The testing process of the update is also divided into two segments and applied in different 
versions of the CWE catalogue. For CWE, version 4.3 was used as the “old” version, and 
version 4.4 was used as the “new and updated” version. The first part is implemented solely in 
Talend. Version 4.4 for CWE is downloaded in XML format and used as input in Talend in 
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order to generate the “Hierarchical Weaknesses” databases, the databases containing the 
“ParentOf”-” ChildOf” connections between the two repositories, in CSV format. 
In order to test the updating process of the “CWE Security Principles” database, the updating 
algorithm seen in Figure 3.10 was implemented using Python in Jupyter Notebook. In the case 
of the CWE, the Python code generates a list of the weaknesses present in both versions with 
an automatic link to the security principles and a list of the new and updated weaknesses only 
present in CWE version 4.4. The outcome provides twenty-six new entries for twenty individual 
weaknesses, which are manually linked to security principles. 
Table 4.10 presents the weaknesses and their security principles’ categories. 
Table 4.10: Number of categories and weaknesses 
Foundational 
Requirements 
Technical Control 
System Requirements Security Sub-principles 
Weaknesses 
ID 
Data integrity 
Error Handling Error Detection 134 
Soft. & Info. Integrity 
Type Evaluation 
Object Comparison 
1236, 131, 
134, 194, 597, 
469, 481 
Input Validation  
Numeric Input 
Validation 
Variable Initialization 
124, 1333, 
329, 190 
Sec. Funct. Verification Security Locks Eval. 366 
Data Confidentiality Use of Cryptography Rand. Gen. Initial 
Values 
1204 
Restrict Data Flow Application Partitioning Data Partitioning 20 
Timely Response to 
Event 
Continuous Monitoring 
Behavior Monitoring 
Signal Handlers 
1281, 1332, 
364, 674 
The information in Table 4.10 represents new weaknesses or existing weaknesses whose 
mitigations have been updated. For instance, “CWE-131: Incorrect Calculation of 
Buffer Size” [77] is an updated weakness, where the mitigation “Use the appropriate type 
for the desired action. For example, in C/C++, only use unsigned types for values that could 
never be negative, such as height, width, or other numbers related to quantity. This will simplify 
validation and will reduce surprises related to unexpected casting.” is added in the new version. 
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Weakness “CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity” [78] is a 
new addition altogether. 
4.3 Result analysis  
Considering the application of the designed methodology on the components of the ICT 
Gateway in sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, an analysis is performed on the results recovered.  
During the identification process, a common characteristic for the weaknesses and the attack 
patterns was that the filtering mechanisms in place significantly limited the number of relevant 
entries. More specifically, for “authentication”, the CWE catalogue provides 680 relevant 
results. As authentication and authorization are concepts that are considered in the CWE search, 
the equivalent number of related weaknesses in the “Access Control” and “Use Control” FRs 
is 224, which after selecting relevant SRs and sub-principles is reduced to 146 where the 
keyword search is applied.  
The system analysis exposed the existence of shared technical requirements and security 
configurations among the components of the system. Either partially or as a whole, some 
aspects of the analysed system are repeated across the components that compose it. For 
example, both the tested components use “MQTT Broker” and “HTTP REST API”, whose 
communications are protected by authentication and encryption mechanisms under “Sec-03”. 
As their functionality is the same on both components, the identified weaknesses, attack 
patterns, and vulnerabilities are the same.  
In extracting relevant vulnerabilities, the results highlight that the amount of information of the 
production of the hardware and software employed, controls the level of relevance of the 
vulnerabilities. Considering the number of available vulnerabilities and the multiple versions 
of the same affected product, a single piece of information can provide multiple results, out of 
which only a few are related to the scenario at hand. For instance, the “MQTT” would provide 
fifty-three results in CVE, only six of which are linked to “Eclipse Mosquitto 1.5”.  
Analysing the results extracted while connecting weaknesses and vulnerabilities from the CWE, 
CVE and NVD catalogues, it is evident that although CWE presents a connection between its 
weaknesses and the vulnerabilities in CVE, CVE does not offer such a relationship. 
Furthermore, NVD lists weaknesses found in CWE as relevant for the vulnerabilities it 
describes, but these relationships are not compliant with CWE. The “CVE-2018-20145” [79] 
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vulnerability is linked to “CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for 
Critical Resource” [80] in the NVD catalogue, but the relationship is not present in the 
CWE catalogue. 
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5 Discussion  
This section provides an in-depth analysis of the findings collected from the drafting process of 
the methodology and the results generated from the use case. The outcomes evaluated and 
linked to the relevant literature presented in section 2.3, their impact outside the scope of the 
thesis is highlighted, and an insight is given in further related research topics. 
5.1 Research gap  
During the drafting of the methodology presented in chapter 3, different features of the process 
indicated notable results.  
Firstly, using the ISA/IEC 62443 standard in the risk assessment to link the assets to the 
weaknesses and attack patterns provides a structured mapping between the technical 
requirements of the standard and the system. The highlight of this approach is the interpretation 
of the technical requirements as security principles providing a potential compliance validation 
method. The compliance of systems to standards, although necessary, is described as a 
complicated and expensive process. According to Portela et al. [33], implementing two security 
standards, ISA/IEC 62443 and ISO/ISA 27001, would not be recommended due to the high 
maintenance price. Hence, the inclusion of the technical perspective of the risk assessment 
process in an underlying manner partially simplifies the application and maintenance of 
standard compliance.  
Secondly, after the security principles have filtered the relevant weaknesses and attack patterns 
of the assets, more in-depth filtering is carried out using the technical characteristics of the 
components of each asset. These characteristics filter the weaknesses and the attack patterns by 
verifying their presence in the descriptive categories of the CWE and CAPEC catalogues seen 
in the semantic approach presented by A.Brazhuk [31].  
Lastly, the use of tree-based graphical representations of the connections among weaknesses, 
vulnerabilities and attack patterns offers the ideal presentation of the relationships between the 
information of the catalogues. The approach in this thesis is a combination of the “security 
knowledge graph” generated by Xiao et al. [36] and “Attack-Defense Trees” seen in sections 
2.3.6 and 2.3.7, which simplify the understanding of the numerous connections between the 
information and the catalogues from the “path” format they embody. 
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5.2 Results evaluation  
Based on the analysis of the results, the advantages and disadvantages of applying the designed 
methodology are listed, followed by an evaluation of the methodology as a whole across the 
objectives set in section 1.2.  
On the one hand, this methodology limits the number of weaknesses, attack patterns, and 
vulnerabilities the user is required to manually filter for relevance to the components under 
assessment and their technical and security requirements, as every selection determines the list 
of relevant entries. Additionally, the selection process is more user-friendly as the user is asked 
to choose the system’s requirements instead of selecting the threats it might face.  
The existence of repeated functions and components minimises the assessment process as 
technical characteristics, and their security features are required to undergo assessment only 
once, and their results can be applied in more than components they comply with. Even in the 
case that the similarity is partial, a “base model” can be generated on which new attributes can 
be added to specialise the results according to the given component. 
On the other hand, the methodology bases the extraction of security information on the 
components of the system, the technical characteristics, which include a thorough description 
of the versions, updates and vendors of the hardware and software in use, and the proper 
definition of the components. This feature diminishes the stability of the effort required and the 
quality of the results acquired based on their relevance to the scenario. Also, as the methodology 
relies so heavily on the information available on the online catalogue, it is notable that although 
the entries are reliable, the catalogues are not complete, nor are the established relationships. 
Hence, it is the user’s responsibility during the collection of the information to verify that no 
information is missing or manually add relevant data. This result was expected considering the 
work seen in section 2.3.4 by Xiao et al. [36], where part of the “security knowledge graphs” is 
dedicated to the “missing” connections. In the methodology seen in section 3, the consequences 
of “missing” relationships are not crucial, as the extracting is applied on all the catalogues; 
hence, the Xiao et al. [36] research validates the graphical representations of the connections as 
a means to correctly linking the collected weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and attack patterns to 
targeted assets. More specifically, as all the identified security concepts and their connections 
are presented to the user as tree-like graphs, the user can easily manipulate the connections to 
determine new paths, establishing the new relationships.  
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Therefore, the methodology provides a complete path of the risk assessment from identifying 
any potential threats on the system to the graphical representation of the latter accompanied by 
the steps that lead to exploitation and the proposed mitigations. However, such a methodology 
requires an extensive understanding of the technical characteristics and the system’s 
functionalities, making the identification process of the threats overly dependable on the 
amount of information the user holds and the understanding and interpreting the categories 
provided. So, the successful implementation of the designed methodology depends on the 
environment of use and the technical level of the user applying it to the system. This outcome 
is closely connected to the work seen by Franqueira et al. [39] in section 2.3.5, as the 
argumentation-based approach of RSA is equivalent to the understanding that the user holds. 
Both approaches highlight that since the security concepts used in filtering are not standard 
options, they can simplify the undertaken process or create added risky security gaps. 
Furthermore, RSA emphasises identifying assets and functional and security system 
requirements before the argumentation input. This setting verifies the assumption seen from the 
results in section 4.3, where extensive knowledge of the system, its components and the 
required security conditions is vital for the entire risk assessment process. 
5.3 Impact  
The concept analysed in this thesis and the results it generated have a significant impact outside 
the scope of the work carried out in this thesis in two levels: 1) contribution to the existing 
research and approaches on the topics managed, and 2) the simplification of the risk assessment 
process on IT/OT systems. 
By using as a basis of the existing work the literature introduced in section 2.3, the approach 
and results that were seen in this thesis expand on the current research by: 
• Using the technical descriptions of the assets as the characteristics connecting them to 
the semantic approach in the work of A.Brazhuk [31] and the ontology approach in the 
work of Wang et al. [35], 
• Expanding the notion of “Attack-Defense Trees” used on the information of the online 
catalogues presented in the section 2.3.6 and 2.3.7, by exploiting the “CanFollow-
CanPrecede” relationship and offering a path from the attack to the weakness and its 
mitigation, and 
• Combining the information found in NVD to add the missing connections between CVE 
vulnerabilities and CWE weaknesses, which is identified in the work of Xiao et al. [36]. 
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Furthermore, new perspectives are introduced that deviate from the work seen in literature: 
• The role of the ISA/IEC 62443 standard in this thesis is based on the part of the proposed 
technical requirements and is in direct connection to the weaknesses and attack patterns 
of the CWE and CAPEC catalogues, and  
• The use of the ISA/IEC 62443 standard as the starting point of the risk assessment 
methodology and as a link between the assets and their security threats provides an 
indirect evaluation of the system’s compliance with the system. 
Moreover, assessing the security condition of IT/OT systems and evaluating the probability that 
any security openings will be exploited has numerous restrictions. On one side, such an 
assessment would require extensive access to security-sensitive hardware and software, and on 
the other side, any testing action would significantly limit the availability of the system. Hence, 
the ability to list any weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and attack patterns relevant to a system 
without testing the actual system would impact the overall approach to the risk assessment 
process of such systems. This concept is more wholesome when the methodology is applied 
with ResilBlockly, as the modelling of the system provides a simulation of the system, its 
components and their functionalities making it easier to assess if the weaknesses are relevant to 
the given scenario and if the selected attack paths can successfully exploit them. 
Hence, the impact of this approach offers an assessment methodology that does not affect the 
availability of the services provided by the IT/OT systems but requires an in-depth 
understanding of the systems’ functionality, which might require trust between the involved 
parties.   
5.4 Future applications  
The work completed in this thesis has multiple areas of further study that can expand the range 
of the offered applications. 
Firstly, different systems might require compliance to different security standards, such as ISA 
TR84.00.09 – Security Related to Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS). Therefore, categorizing 
the weaknesses and attack patterns of the CWE and CAPEC catalogues into “security 
principles” that are extracted from the necessary standard can offer a dual functionality: risk 
assessment and compliance of the system to the required standards. The compliance evaluation 
process may easily be semi-automated and indirectly applied through the risk assessment. More 
specifically, by identifying the requirements that each standard sets for the system they target, 
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the weaknesses and the attack patterns can be linked to these requirements through their 
mitigations. Hence a direct link is established between them. Once the standard is chosen for 
the risk assessment, following the presented methodology, the compliance is determined 
through the weaknesses identified by listing the vulnerable requirements of the standard 
according to the potential weaknesses that luck mitigations.  
Another further application of the work seen in this thesis is the use the graphical trees to 
generate automated tests on the modelled system. These tests can be used as replacements for 
the penetration testing used to identify a system’s weaknesses and evaluate if the selected attack 
patterns can lead to the identified weaknesses. This expansion of the methodology is based on 
the work by S. Salva and L. Regainia as presented in “An Approach for Guiding Developers in 
the Choice of Security Solutions and in the Generation of Concrete Test Cases” [81]. The 
approach takes advantage of the ADTool generated Attack-Defense Trees to create test cases 
through Eclipse, which are executed on the system and a list of results is provided indicating 
whether or not the attacks were successfully carried away. The test provides two types of 
results:  
• if the attacks are successful, the weaknesses connected to these paths are verified as 
weak points, and  
• once the mitigations are applied, the results will verify the successful application of the 
countermeasures  
These tests are based on the “GWT” pattern: 
• “Given”: established the appropriate state for the action   
• “When”: initiates the action 
• “Then”: verifies the success or failure of the test case  
In this case, the difference to be adapted would be the execution of the tests on the generated 
models in such a way that the results would reflect on the actual system. Hence, this format 
would offer the opportunity to test an IT/OT system without abstracting the availability of the 
functionalities offered by them. 
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6 Conclusion  
The Industry’s transition from 1.0 to 4.0 offered numerous advantages in the quality of 
performance and productivity, but it also introduced the cybersecurity threats of Information 
Technology (IT) to Operational Technology (OT) systems. Hence, a methodology is designed 
for the risk assessment of IT/OT systems by employing publicly available security catalogues 
that list the known weaknesses, attack patterns and vulnerabilities and their descriptive 
characteristics like the mitigations and detection methods. The purpose of this methodology is 
to provide a risk assessment approach that does not hinder OT availability and a filtering 
process for the significant amount of data in security catalogues.  
The risk assessment process begins with analysing the system under assessment by dividing its 
assets into components characterised by security configurations and technical requirements. 
After the target components are identified, they are mapped to the potential threats that might 
render them vulnerable to attacks. This is achieved by employing the Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE), Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC), 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and 
Common Platform Enumerations (CPE) catalogues, which offer information on weaknesses, 
attack patterns and vulnerabilities identified and publicly classified. The methodology uses the 
established “ParentOf”-“ChildOf” and “CanFollow”-“CanPrecede” relationships between the 
entries of the same catalogue, and “RelatedTo” relationships between entries of different 
catalogues, which are seen between CWE and CAPEC or CVE and CPE.  
Furthermore, the ISA/IEC 62443 Standard and the concept of security principles are applied to 
categorise the information of the catalogues further and link them to the system under 
assessment. The ISA/IEC 62443 Standard provides security requirements in the form of 
“Foundational Requirements (FRs)” and “Technical Control System Requirements (SRs)” that 
create levels of filtering for both weaknesses found in CWE and attack patterns found in 
CAPEC. Hence, the FRs connect the components as a whole to the weaknesses and attack 
patterns, while the SRs and security sub-principles further limit the number of relevant 
connections.  
Following the weaknesses and attack patterns, the vulnerabilities are identified and filtered 
through the CPE catalogue that utilises the name, vendor, version and update information of 
the software and hardware in the components to detect the CVE vulnerabilities that might affect 
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them. If the detected CVE vulnerabilities are also found in NVD, it offers direct links between 
the entries in CWE and the entries in CVE while providing information on the severity levels 
of the vulnerabilities through the different versions of CVSS.  
Once all the information is collected, linked and filtered, the methodology takes advantage of 
the connections to represent the threats of a system graphically. These representations highlight 
the weaknesses, attack patterns, vulnerabilities, security patterns, and relationships established 
among them in four trees of unique focus.   
This methodology was developed with ResilBlockly as a target system, where the provided 
system and its components are divided into subcomponents over the modelling phase. Links to 
the online catalogues are already implemented to apply the filtering steps before the searching 
process based on the modelled components. Hence, considering the information collected, the 
user would benefit from a graphical representation of the connections to assist in the filtering 
process and provide an in-depth understanding of the potential threats, mitigations, and steps to 
reach them.  
In order to test this methodology, the ICT Gateway system is assessed through its components. 
The outcomes of the testing process verify that the methodology offers advantages compared 
to manual or single-factor search mechanisms, as it restrains the number of weaknesses or attack 
patterns the user is required to review manually. So, the information of the catalogues is 
categorised based on the security requirements they target or the particular software or hardware 
in use, which might be recurrent throughout the components. However, the dependability of the 
information on community-based catalogues and the knowledge and understanding of the user 
over the system affects the stability of the methodology. 
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